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a Spanish Enclave in North Africa
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ABSTRACT
How do stereotypes – as rhetorical, homogenising claims about the
Self and Other – survive despite their users having personal experi-
ences that contradict them? This article addresses this question by
examining why the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the Spanish
enclave of Ceuta insist the ‘moro’ is a cunning, hostile antagonist, even
when their interactions with Moroccans tend to be profitable, and
even as ethnographers of mainland Spain report widespread revisions
of the Moorish migrant’s negative image and the country’s Islamic
past. Building on the interpretative model of stereotypes developed
by Herzfeld, Brown and Theodossopolous, I argue that the ‘moro’ per-
sists as an unequivocally malevolent character because it (1) is culti-
vated by a number of financially interested actors and (2) is central
to the discursive strategies Ceutans use to respond to the political
threats to their españolidad from both north and south. 
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Walking in Morocco
‘Sebtawi?’ the Moroccan man sitting beside me in one of the squares
of Tétuan asked. ‘Yes,’ I replied in Spanish, lying the way my friends
in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave forty kilometres to the north, had in -
structed me to. ‘Your friend’s necklace’, he continued in fluent Span-
ish, ‘belongs to my daughter. Give it back.’ 
He would have had an easier time getting me to surrender my arm.
As my Ceutan friends had warned, our trip was nothing short of stress-
ful. It was only April, but the Mediterranean sun had already found
its strength, and was beating us down mercilessly. My travelling com-
panion, an English friend who visited me in Ceuta (on the condition
we explore Morocco), had injured himself a few days before, and had
to go about on crutches. He now sweated, puffed and struggled
through the crowded, narrow, hilly, cobbled streets of north Morocco’s
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medinas. local guides found us easy targets, and we were permanently
pursued by a crowd of men intent on showing us the ‘best sites’ while
promising (excellent) deals on carpets, jewellery, perfume and mari-
juana. My Ceutan acquaintances, concerned, were calling practically
every few minutes: ‘Where are you?’ ‘What are you eating?’ ‘It cost
how much?!’ ‘Hands on passports and wallets at all times!’ But I was
also trying to study my map, torn after days of abuse, seeking the eas-
iest routes for my suffering friend. I found that two hands were not
enough to keep all my belongings under control. Two eyes were simi-
larly insufficient to track everything happening around us. I was switch-
ing from English, to Spanish, to my limited Dariya – the Arabic dialect
spoken in northern Morocco and by Ceuta’s Muslims – every two sec-
onds; I was speaking the wrong language to the wrong people, and my
patience was at its limit. 
‘no,’ I said, ‘this necklace is ours.’ ‘Thief!’ came back his reply.
‘liar!’ my companion spat back. The argument quickly escalated into
a scuffle, and the man was on the ground, calling for the police and
threatening us with prison. Onlookers looked on indifferently, but we
hobbled away anyway, slightly alarmed. 
Slightly alarmed became very alarmed, because the next time my
friends called, I made the mistake of telling them what had happened.
‘Being called a thief in Morocco is a very serious accusation!’ Ana, a
Spanish high-school teacher, screamed over the phone. ‘You should
have never gone to Morocco alone! Get back to Ceuta, now!’  
panicked, I hailed a taxi and after a few minutes of haggling, we
were on our way to the border. Ana called again. ‘Take this address.
Got a pen? So, 12, rue Ghomora-’ 
I cut her off, ‘Wait, what’s this!?’ 
‘Embassy in rabat. In case they don’t let you cross the border. It’s
the word of a “moro” against that of a foreigner! look, Maria and I are
going to cross the border to pick you up. Meet us by the mosque of
Castillejos.’ Ceutans call Moroccan towns by their old colonial names. 
We met the girls and started our drive back, brooding in silence. I
was unsure whether to be angry at my companion for insisting on
going to Morocco on crutches, at my Ceutan friends for driving me
paranoid or at myself for losing my anthropological cool. Soon we
reached the border. Ana confidently led us through the thick crowds
of traders and towards the Moroccan checkpoint. As we stepped up
to the guards, she handed us Moroccan emigration forms which, to
my surprise, she had pre-filled for us. She tersely told us to sign them
and not speak unless spoken to. A brief conversation in French with
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the Moroccan gendarmes followed, and we entered the hundred-or-so
meters of fortified fences that constitute no-man’s-land. Ana then
asked us for our passports, arranged them into a pile with hers on top,
and nonchalantly approached the Spanish border guards. They took
one glance at the top passport and waved us into Ceuta. We re-joined
Maria, who had taken a different route reserved for vehicles, and
breathed a sigh of relief as we drove home through familiar neighbour-
hoods. Only then did Ana speak at length, clearly annoyed: ‘We told
you not to go alone! There’s nothing great about Morocco! It is a dan-
gerous place! unlike yourselves we have learnt to walk (hemos aprendido
a andar) in Morocco since we were kids!’ 
Questioning Stereotypes
Our swashbuckling trip across Morocco gave me a tale I was encour-
aged to narrate on many occasions. My performance often yielded
counter-stories from my Ceutan audiences about tense experiences
they or their acquaintances claim to have had during some of their
many visits across the border. These anecdotes insist that while
Morocco is indeed alluring, it would be a serious mistake to treat it as
the exotic, hospitable country tourists or mainland Spaniards usually
think it is. The ‘neighbouring country’ is rather depicted as a danger-
ous space where disaster can strike unexpectedly, leaving visitors
stranded amongst the ‘moros’: jealous natives who will use any available
resource (including law and bureaucracy) to harm Spaniards and their
interests. As with the protagonist of Kafka’s nightmarish ‘The Trial’,
the ‘moro’ emerges in Ceutan discourse as a figure who attacks their
pockets, bodies and españolidad (Spanishness), imagining himself as an
amalgamation of ‘the God of Victory’ and ‘the God of Justice’. To Ceu-
tans themselves, however, the ‘moro’ is but the cruel ‘God of the Hunt’
(Kafka 2009: 105–106). 
These stories allow us to address a central problematic in the study
of stereotypes. namely, how do stereotypes survive when confronted
with personal experiences that contradict them? undeniably, the
majority of interactions between my informants and Moroccans were
generally uneventful – sometimes even profitable and enjoyable –
affairs. But this never budged their conviction that Moroccans are
dirty and backwards, particularly when it comes to gender. Moroccan
men, Ceutans insist, sexually harass foreign women and force their
own wives to wear scarves and participate in the gruelling petty-trad-
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ing of the border. ‘Moras’, on the other hand, are at once pitied and
scorned for lacking the courage to stand up to the men, although the
Spanish matrons who employ them as maids say that they share with
their menfolk a special cunning which they use to cheat outsiders or
each other. 
Social scientists typically regard stereotypes as claims about cul-
tural ‘others’ that are fundamentally uninformed and often ethnocen-
tric and degrading. This paradigm, which traces its origin to
lippmann (1922), lies at the heart of many studies interested in gaug-
ing the ‘truth content’ of stereotypes (see Oakes and reynolds 1997).
research also evaluates the extent to which emotions of fear, disgust
or anger induced by stereotypes interfere with the calculation of risk
(anything from deciding where to live, which job candidate to hire and
how to distribute state welfare; Abramson 1975; Brown 2010). Since
sociologists conclude that stereotypes give rise to prejudices that
obstruct the development of modern multicultural societies and effi-
cient market economies, they additionally study how they are formed
and diffused in order to learn how to break them (Chaiken and Stan-
gor 1987; Klein et al. 2003).
Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ (1987) offers an alternative approach,
and sees stereotypes as important clues as to how colonial relations
between the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ are inextricably linked to the pro-
duction of knowledge about non-Western ‘Others’. The orientalist gaze
exaggerates the ‘non-Western’ world as exotic but irrational, spiritual
though infantile, and therefore simultaneously untainted by moder-
nity and in need of ‘Western’ guidance. Orientalised societies find
themselves having to entertain these notions (Argyrou 2002; Fleming
2000; rabinowitz 1993).    
pushing against the shortcomings of lippmann (where individuals
seem unable to think critically about stereotypes) and Said’s blind spots
(the subaltern can themselves create stereotypes and/or manipulate rep-
resentations about them) is an anthropological interpretative approach.
Following Barth’s thesis on cultural boundaries (1969), this model exam-
ines stereotypes as strategic essentialisations crafted to establish us-and-
them boundaries and legitimise all sorts of practices, including ones of
domination (Jansen 2003; Theodossopolous 2003; Theodossopolous
and Brown 2007). This framework is sensitive to the fact that as rhetor-
ical gestures, these ‘pragmatic essentialisations’ can be rejected or even
‘ironically’ refashioned into counter-discourses (Chock 1987; Herzfeld
1982, 1992). For example, southern European communities are com-
monly stereotyped as passionate, friendly and warm, traits that are used
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to both blame them for and excuse them from their recent financial cri-
sis (e.g. Herzfeld 2005; Kirstoglou and Tsimouris 2016; Theodos-
sopolous 2013). This article follows this interpretative approach to
stereotypes, and considers who invokes the ‘moro’, why and the extent
to which this performance is accepted. Moreover, an analysis of the
‘moro’ as a technology of (self)inclusion and (self)exclusion, must take
into account how the myths, images, symbols, categories, assumptions
and ‘cultural stuff’ (Barth 1969) stereotypes draw from or push against
are generally handed down historically.  
Tracing the historical trajectory of the ‘moro’ is a particularly inter-
esting exercise, for the Spanish construction of the Moroccan ‘Other’
has long been central to the equally thorny problem of defining just
what it means to be ‘Spanish’ (Marín 2015; Martín Corrales 2002).
The ‘moro’ emerges as a bloodthirsty antagonist – in clerical and stately
texts, and in popular tales and ballads – in the final stages of the
reconquista. This form changes little over the next three centuries,
as Barbary pirates repeatedly scourge Spain’s shores (Hazbun 2015).
In the nineteenth century, British and French travellers, compiling
accounts of their journeys in the area into popular diaries, started com-
plicating the figure of the ‘moro’. Their Moorish subject was chivalrous,
humble, passionate and aesthetically sophisticated. Their gaze, how-
ever, wandered northward, and Spaniards found their own country,
steeped in its Moorish past and struggling to keep up with European
industrial development, itself becoming the target of the orientalist
eye (Moreras 2015; Velasco de Castro 2014).
reconciling this triple contradiction – the ‘moro’ as irreconcilably
noble and savage; Spain as simultaneously modern and not; Spain as
both European and Moorish – would become the major task of Spanish
historians like Castro (1971) and Sánchez-Albornoz (1975). It also pre-
sented a fount of opportunity for Spanish gsovernments. In the 1900s
the idea of a deep historical and cultural ‘fraternity’ with the Moor was
amongst the arguments used to convince the Great powers to allow a
Spanish protectorate in northern Morocco (dieste 2003; Tofino-Que-
sada 2003). during the Civil War, the nationalist faction again invoked
fraternal, honourable ‘moro’ to mobilise Moorish troops against the god-
less republic. They also liberally diffused the image of the bloodthirsty
‘moro’, a view enthusiastically adopted by republican militias who
cursed Franco as second Count Julian as they fled in terror (Friedlander
1964; Madraiga 2015; Sotomayor Blazquez 2005). 
Contemporary Spain still engages with these contradictions, now
exacerbated by the increased presence of Muslims in Spain (Suarez-
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navas 2005) and a financial crisis that demolished national post-tran-
sition narratives of progress and Europeanization (Sabaté 2016). Thus,
Granada’s Moorish past has become a tourist commodity. It is also
central to Muslims’ (converts and migrants) campaigns for recognition
(rogozen-Soltar 2012, 2017). Elsewhere, festivals commemorating vic-
tories over the Moors now function to integrate migrants, rehabilitate
the image of the Moor and consolidate village solidarity (Harris 1994;
Kottman 2011). In Barcelona and Ceuta, a discourse of convivencia
coexists with constant interference in Muslim affairs (Moreras 2015).  
In light of this creativity, several questions emerge. Why is the ‘moro’,
an ambiguous character in Spain, unequivocally malevolent in Ceuta?
What does this say about the way Ceutans present themselves and
react to recurring challenges to their españolidad? These questions,
opened by the interpretative model, will help us understand why
stereotypes remain acceptable despite their very users undergoing
experiences that contradict them. 
This article is based on twenty months of fieldwork conducted in
Ceuta between 2012 and 2017. The bulk of my material comes from
close observation of how my Spanish informants talked about and
interacted with Morocco and its inhabitants. This data is supple-
mented by my experience as a freelance journalist collaborating with
several of Ceuta’s newspapers. This privileged view allowed me to
incorporate into my analysis the reproduction of the ‘moro’ in the Ceu-
tan press, which regularly published tales of misadventure in Morocco.
Moro Moruno
Overlooking the Straits of Gibraltar, Ceuta – along with Melilla far
to the east, and a few other islets along Morocco’s Mediterranean
coastline – belongs to Spain. In 2016, the Spanish national Institute
for Statistics placed Ceuta’s population at 84,500. The Spanish state
does not keep statistics about religious affiliation. nonetheless, Ceuta’s
bureaucrats estimate that only 56 per cent of Ceuta’s population are
‘cristianos’, a term that refers to one’s provenance from the Spanish
mainland (and not religious belief). Many ‘cristianos’, indeed, are not
Ceutan-born. They are colloquially spoken of as ‘de fuera’, outsiders
who came to Ceuta for the generous bonuses and tax exemptions
offered by Ceuta’s public and military sectors, which – after the end
of the golden age of bulk trading in the 1980s and the end of the mil-
itary levy in 1992 – became Ceuta’s only real industry, employing
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roughly half of its active population (Observatorio de las Ocupaciones
2016; Villada paredes 2009). Around 1–2 per cent are Jewish and
Hindu, typically successful businessmen and wealthy landowners. In
2017, the unión de Comunidades Islámicas de Ceuta claimed 36,000
(42%) are ‘musulmanes ceutíes’ (uCIdCE 2017). Some proudly trace their
descent to military ancestors serving in the Civil War. The vast major-
ity, however, arrived after Morocco’s independence (1956) or the
nationalisation of Spain’s Muslims (1986). 
My Muslim informants complained that their españolidad is con-
stantly challenged. They lamented that, in daily conversation or on
social media, they are called ‘moros’ or told to ‘go back to their country’,
that police constantly stop them to ask for identification, and that they
are bullied into participating in anti-Moroccan protests or nationalist
rites such as the ‘Kissing of the Flag’. Most Muslims participate reluc-
tantly because they do not think their nationality has to be proven and
they reject the narrative suggesting their nationality was ‘given’, not
‘recognised’. Muslims are furthermore unable to compete effectively
with other ethno-religious groups for positions in the public sector, or
with the thousands of Moroccans selling their labour cheaply as
labourers and servants. This underclass subsists on welfare, establishes
clientistic ties in the hope of securing low-key jobs, uses Moroccan con-
nections to supply small shops, works in the precariously miniscule
private sector, joins the army (where promotion is difficult) or traffics
drugs (no longer very lucrative but still very dangerous). 
In 1995, much to the anger of the Kingdom of Morocco, which
claims Ceuta as its own, the enclave was declared an Autonomous City
by the central government in Madrid. Ideologically, this confirmed
Ceuta as an inextricable part of Spain, on par with the country’s main-
land territories. practically, Ceuta’s town hall gained extensive self-
governing powers, although matters of national interest (e.g. education
and border-management) remain under control of a delegate appointed
directly by Madrid (Gold 2000). 
Morocco never relinquished its claim on Ceuta, but diplomatic rela-
tions have cooled down and the delegate regularly reports successful
meetings with Moroccan ‘friends’ over issues of trade, migration and
terrorism (e.g. El Faro 2012b). Further down the bureaucratic ladder
and closer to the ground, things are rather different. My Christian and
Muslim Ceutan informants offered several explanations: Moroccans
are by nature deceitful; Spanish colonialism has generated hateful
resentment; Tétuan’s population has grown beyond what regional
labour markets can support, creating bands of desperately unemployed
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people. All agree it best, therefore, to assume that the ‘moro’ will try to
prey upon Spaniards. Ceutan newspapers toil in vain to depict, say,
Moroccan kids abandoned in Ceuta as poor souls who must be cared
for, or porteadoras as hard women who brave the border, where death
through exhaustion or stampeding is a possibility, to feed their children
(El Faro 2017a). But to most of my informants these macabre spectacles
prove that ‘moros’ will happily oppress even each other to death, and
will use Spain’s commitment to human rights to turn Ceuta into ‘a
nursery’ for their ‘ill-mannered children’. Occasionally, Spanish men
take young Moroccan brides, but acquaintances insist the tie is one of
conveniencia, not convivencia. likewise, Christian women might (rarely)
take a Moroccan lover, and though they boast about their incompara-
ble passions, my other informants grimly state that ‘moros love to fuck
us where it hurts’, and suspect these women are trying to spite their
families. undoubtedly, her reputation – and that of any Spanish future
lovers – is strongly compromised. ‘If you sleep with the dog, you wake
up with the fleas’, one civil servant bluntly remarked. 
The ‘moro’ is therefore unambiguously a parasite and an outsider.
not even Ceutan Muslim associations have dared lend the term a pos-
itive connotation. They identify themselves as ‘musulmanes’, and it is
with cries of ‘racista’ that they counter those who label them as ‘moros’,
a gesture stemming from fear that Muslims’ claim to Spanish identity,
along with their increasingly vociferous socio-political demands (which
include financial help so that Muslims can adequately compete for
jobs, the officialisation of Dariya the official adoption of Muslim feasts,
halal food etc.) constitute but a ploy designed to suck Ceutan wealth
in the short-term and compromise Ceuta’s Spanish character in the
long run. 
Why engage with ‘moros’, then, if they are so disagreeable? Mainly,
because it pays. Moroccan maids, labourers and construction workers
settle for informal contracts and wages high by Moroccan standards
and low by Spanish ones. Attempts by the state to normalise (and tax)
this industry consistently fail, because Ceutans prefer to sack Moroc-
can labour than surrender control over their potentially dangerous
workforce (Campbell in press). 
The rewards for daring Ceuta’s Moroccan hinterland could also be
substantial. On Saturday mornings many Ceutans go to the market
town of Castillejos, right across the border, to purchase vegetables,
bread and fuel for their cars. Many pursue their shopping expeditions
into the town’s sprawling bazaar in search of deals on anything from
gifts and home additions to electronics and washing powder.  
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Ceutans’ attraction towards Morocco goes deeper still. As Tofino-
Quesada (2003) has argued, the image of timelessly tranquil Morocco
became widespread during the protectorate’s less turbulent years.
unsurprisingly, therefore, that informants raised there in the twilight
of the protectorate nostalgically return to (but never enter) their child-
hood houses or neighbourhoods, remarking how much Morocco has
– or has not – changed. Moreover, Ceutans admit that Morocco has
charms Ceuta lacks: the beautiful blue medina of Chefchaouen; deli-
cious tagines and seafood at the eateries of rio Martil; the joys of hag-
gling in Tétuan’s markets; impressive beaches and mountain trails for
hiking, cycling and off-roading; lavish hotels, and many other little
luxuries they can easily afford with their high wages. My informants
captured whatever they found beautiful about Morocco by the term
‘moruno’. As an adjective, it referred to cultural products that could be
alienated from the ‘moros’ who produce them. Certainly, my inform-
ants explicitly commented that their enjoyment of ‘moruno’ cuisine,
jewellery or architecture did not mean they had to like ‘moros’. ‘Moruno’
derives from ‘moro’ but the two are not different sides of the same coin.  
Kafkesque Morocco  
Ceutans imagine Morocco as a place where misfortune can happen
anywhere and anytime, leaving one at the mercy of a hostile popula-
tion. Certainly, they disclaim, some situations are more dangerous
than others. One should avoid frequenting the labyrinthine suburbs
of Moroccan cities, following strangers or visiting during ramadan
when ‘Muslims are edgy’. However, they insist, once a traveller has
cleared the Spanish side of the border, one should expect the worst,
even when with large groups of experienced Ceutans or in the well-
trodden markets of Castillejos or Chefchaouen.
Early in my fieldwork, a Ceutan family reported its tragic story to
El Faro. After a morning browsing Tétuan’s markets, the family stopped
for lunch in a café in Tétuan’s main square. ‘Suddenly’, they got into
an argument with the café owner. It turned into a fistfight in which a
female member of the Ceutan family was knocked down, breaking her
hip. Instead of helping out, Moroccan bystanders chased the Spaniards
out into the street, threatening to call the police to prevent them from
crossing the border. The family first sought assistance at the Spanish
Consulate, some 400 meters away. But the bureaucrats on duty asked
them to wait behind ‘a long queue of Moroccans who wanted their visas
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stamped’. When their turn finally came, they were told that nothing
could be done regarding the threats they had received. nor could they
provide an ambulance. Eventually, they got hold of the hospital’s num-
ber, and after a long bout of haggling in broken French, the family
agreed to part with €300 to secure an ambulance to take them to the
border, possibly in vain since they had no guarantee they would be let
through. The Kafkesque nightmare was brought to an end by the
Guardia Civil, who negotiated their re-entry into Spain and transferred
the shocked family to hospital (El Faro 2012a). 
Another article interviews Manolo, who, while shopping in Castille-
jos, was accused of theft and thrown into jail to await trial. It took Ceu-
tan authorities a couple of days to locate him and another month to get
him back. The article ends with Manolo burning his passport, solemnly
swearing never to return to Morocco. The article makes reference to
the case of a Ceutan man who red-handedly caught a Moroccan trying
to steal his motorbike in Castillejos. When confronted, the Moroccan
pulled out a knife and accused the Ceutan of stealing the bike weeks
earlier. Bystanders rushed to help their compatriot, the police inter-
vened, the bike was confiscated and the Ceutan imprisoned for a few
days until Spanish authorities negotiated his release (El Faro 2012e).
local newspapers are frequently approached by readers wanting to
publish their dramatic stories to ‘warn others’ (e.g. Ceuta al dia 2006b,
2009b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; El Faro 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b). Most
tales, however, never go beyond mundane conversations in cafes or
the workplace. They lament at how they or their friends were held by
Moroccan border or traffic police, or called to appear before Moroc-
can courts for crimes that already tried in Ceuta. They complain that
Moroccans watched impassively when Spaniards slipped on cobbled
roads, were (accidentally) hit by cars or suffered heatstroke. Stories of
visitors tricked by shop owners, taxi drivers and hotel owners, insulted
in or chased away from public places, and, in the case of women, sex-
ually intimidated and harassed, occur on a daily basis. 
A number of strategies are therefore employed to enable Ceutans
to ‘walk in Morocco’ as safely as possible. One tactic is never to visit
Morocco in the first place. Above, Manolo invalidates his passport,
denying Morocco the power to lure him in.  likewise, a small number
of informants proudly stated they do not have a passport. Others, like
dani, a teacher in his thirties, say they have not crossed the border in
years. ‘What’s the point?’ dani explained, ‘I’m going to be all tense
and afraid. Here I’m bored, but relaxed.’
BrIAn CAMpBEll
136
ajec260209_Layout 1  11/02/20  7:33 PM  Page 136
A second tactic requires the careful presentation of self in front of
Moroccans. When filling immigration forms, I was always advised,
the purpose of the visit should be ‘tourism’. Anything else raises sus-
picions, giving authorities incentive to scrutinise one’s luggage and
documents. My informants also insisted on presenting themselves as
‘sebtawi’, Arabic for ‘Ceutan’. A ‘sebtawi’, according to my interlocutors,
is a powerful figure in Moroccans’ imagination who knows their tricks
intimately. A ‘sebtawi’ might discourage Moroccan guards from asking
bribes or creating red tape. The roving individuals offering (scam) visa
services at the border will not ply their trade on a ‘sebtawi’. Taxi drivers
and merchants should expect their rhetoric about hard times and
starving children to fall on deaf ears. A ‘sebtawi’ knows what’s worth
what in Morocco. 
Thirdly, one should rely on contacts and information from trust-
worthy sources. Snippets of knowledge are readily exchanged between
Spanish friends: an excellent pastry shop tucked away in the back
alleys of Castillejos, a restaurant with a hospitable owner, a little beach
ignored even by locals where women can sunbathe without attracting
unwanted attention. Contacts might additionally be provided by those
rare Moroccan acquaintances – namely domestic workers – who, after
many years of service, proved their reliability and worth. It is not
unheard of for workers to invite their employer’s family to their home
for a few days (often to celebrate rituals such as Eid el-Fitr). More com-
monly, however, they introduce their employers to hoteliers or taxi
drivers (almost always kin) willing to settle for fair prices without argu-
ment. Thus, the ensuing long drives through the winding mountain
paths are occupied with the driver congratulating his passengers on
finding him, ‘for Moroccans are bad people who would surely cheat
them’. Ceutan clients nod agreement, provide horrible tales of their
own, and repeatedly promise their patronage. Exploration is therefore
slow and almost always done upon the advice of trusted friends. Know-
ing how to enjoy oneself and stay out of trouble go hand in hand.  
Fourthly, Ceutans try to minimise confrontation with locals. This
normally requires a tactical sort of deference, particularly when deal-
ing with agents of the law. I was often instructed to stay calm in front
of bureaucrats, especially those who, as one teacher commented,
‘understand Spanish, but will only speak French or Arabic’. Much
like Ana in the introductory vignette, my informants swallowed their
pride and tried to cultivate a basic control of French to prevent their
encounters with officials from turning into potentially deadly games
of charades. 
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deference is without fail shown to the ultimate predators, the
Moroccan traffic police. One day, I accompanied pedro, a doctor, who
was taking his mother to Tanger’s airport. The plane was delayed, and
amidst complaints that in Morocco nothing works, we left Tanger
much later than planned in a sour mood; children had to be picked
from school and I had an important interview scheduled. Yet pedro
would not push his car past a poor 40km/hour, slowing to 30km when
approaching a traffic policeman and driving on only once the officer
waved us angrily along and was thanked with a nod and a ‘shukran’. 
‘We’re not risking it,’ pedro said eventually, sensing my discomfort.
We made a tight curve that revealed a spike-strip guarded by two
policemen. ‘See!’ he said as we ground to a halt, ‘Checkpoints in blind
spots! So they can catch you over-speeding! Moroccan police are not
about prevention, but punishment!’ 
As I texted my acquaintance to postpone our interview, I asked,
equally frightened, entertained and annoyed: ‘What if we are stopped?’
He flipped open one of the car’s side pockets, and two heavy envelopes
fell onto my lap. One contained all the documentation one could ever
need to justify driving in Morocco. The other contained 6,000
dirhams. ‘Moros like money,’ pedro smiled, ‘we have plenty of it’.
Finally, Ceutans anticipate challenges to their españolidad, especially
when playing the ‘sebtawi’ card. Consider Sandra’s story: 
I visit my friend in Melilla often. My husband hates driving, so I do it
myself … One day we were stopped by a policeman who asked why my
husband was not driving. What?! Can’t women drive?! I just told him
my husband was sick. He gave my husband a mocking look, then said I
was driving too slowly. ‘Oh, sorry, was I? I’m nervous! I rarely drive!’ He
let us go. I’ll be like his stupid wife for ten minutes. 
rocío, a teacher, had a similar experience driving to Chefchaouen. 
The policeman wanted to know whether my husband and I were mar-
ried. He spent minutes looking at our passports – he clearly could not
read them – then wanted to know why we’re not Muslim! I bit my tongue
and told him that we were working on it. He let us pass! Some want to
see you lash out in anger, so they can detain you!
And Juan, a primary school teacher: 
last year I took a group of visiting friends to Arsila, and were stopped
by a policeman. ‘Sebtawin! Moroccans with a red passport!’ he exclaimed!
I was becoming red in the face. But my girlfriend intervened, ‘yes, until
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Many of my informants report similar interrogations regarding
improper dress (particularly by women in summer), the composition
of groups (i.e. men and women travelling together), and food (espe-
cially alcohol found in car boots). The triumphal tone of these stories,
however, suggests that the surrender of what they think defines them
as Ceutan – their españolidad and that of their city, and the subscription
to ‘modern’ values – is a controlled feint based on claimed knowledge
of how Moroccans think Ceutans think. My informants let Moroccan
officers believe they won the encounter, safe in the knowledge that
they denied the ‘moro’ the opening to cause further harm. 
Being Muslim and Spanish on the 
Other Side of the Border
The vast majority of the Ceutan Muslims families I have come to know
during fieldwork maintain strong ties with kin and friends in Morocco,
whom they visit often.  Business partnerships and intermarriage,
though suspiciously approached, are common, and Ceutan Muslims,
like ‘cristianos’, enjoy Morocco’s cities and countryside. despite this,
Ceutan Muslims (particularly those with deep roots in Spain) claim
to be especially vulnerable to the jealous ‘moros’, notably those recent
arrivals from the south. Moroccans return the animosity. The informal
workers and Moroccan migrants I interviewed think ‘sebtawis’ have
been spoilt by welfare and the drug trade, and unable/unwilling to do
honest work. These traitors to the Moroccan cause, they add, are so
uncouth, they are effectively semi-lingual, unable to speak neither
Dariya nor Spanish properly.
Tensions are certainly high. One autumn day, I joined a group of
fifteen Muslims on a hike across the hills south of Chefchaouen.
Moroccans stared as our group thundered by, chatting loudly so as all
could hear their deliberate mixing of Spanish and Dariya. Eventually,
we passed by a group of young men. ‘Sebtawin’, one said. Spittle darted
from his mouth and exploded inches from Khalila, the middle-aged
woman who organised the trip. Bilal, her 20-year-old son, flinging his
satchel to the ground, turned to meet the smirking offender. But his
father restrained him. ‘do I need to remind you who you are? do you
take insult from Moroccans?’ We walked away, but made sure we took
a different route back to our bus. 
Muslims seemed to be the protagonists of the most dramatic stories
the press reported. For example, Anuar went to Morocco to buy drugs
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he could traffic back to Ceuta. He was caught by Moroccan policemen,
tried as a Moroccan citizen and sentenced to three years in a prison
in Meknes. One night his family received a call informing them that
Anuar had been beaten in his cell. prison guards had stormed the cells
looking for mobile phones. They found none, but still they ‘[stomped]
on Anuar’s neck, legs and arms until he was practically unconscious,
all the while throwing cold water at him. Then, they tied him upside
down and beat him until he was almost dead’. Anuar’s mother imme-
diately went to Meknes, but the prison guards insisted they were hold-
ing no one by that name, despite her visiting her son four times since
his incarceration. desperate, she appealed to the Spanish Consulate
for help. The consulate concluded that they could not do anything
unless directed by a higher judiciary institution. Ceutan authorities
were also unable to relocate the youth. His family had to wait, ‘fearing
daily for his life,’ until he completed his sentence in december 2012
(El Faro 2012f).  
The harassment of Ceutan Muslims is regularly reported in local
newspapers (e.g. Ceuta al dia 2006a, 2009a; El Faro 2014). As with ‘cris-
tianos’, Muslim informants claim that Moroccan hostility has to be fac-
tored into their most quotidian interactions. Volunteers at food banks
run by Muslim organisations bitterly handed out their scarce resources
to ‘moros’ resident in Ceuta, who they suspect will sell them in
Morocco. Muslim acquaintances also regularly grumbled about ‘moros
taking over the outlying neighbourhoods’, who ‘come for welfare, but
don’t integrate, scaring the Christians, who cannot tell us apart’. lead-
ers of Muslim associations – who look to Morocco for religious guid-
ance – constantly have to convince both ‘the moros’ and their fellow
Ceutans that, regardless of what Moroccan authorities say, they are
‘not brothers in exile’ and defer to the ‘Commander of the Faithful’
(the Moroccan king) only in matters of faith. Behind closed doors they
swear ‘the moro’ just wants to make their life difficult.  
Anxieties skyrocket when marriage is on the agenda. My fieldnotes
are filled with the kin of love-struck Ceutans interrogating their contacts
to divine whether ‘the moro’ is really only after ‘Spanish papers’. Family
members insist upon an extended courtship to sieve out less determined
pretenders. I only saw one marriage called off, but worries persist that
the Spanish documents marking the couple’s marital status would be
declared invalid, opening them to charges of adultery/fornication ( ).
Moroccan unpredictability, some concluded, is a ploy to induce Ceutans
to set aside Spanish rites, marry the Moroccan way and voluntarily sur-
render their españolidad in a rational attempt to manage risk. 
BrIAn CAMpBEll
140
ajec260209_Layout 1  11/02/20  7:33 PM  Page 140
Like Children!
Threats to españolidad from Morocco are to be expected. Infinitely
more disturbing are those perceived coming from mainland Spain.
The first post-transition socialist governments actively toyed with the
possibility of selling the enclaves, and it was recently discovered that
the King himself was initially partial to the idea (Ceuta al dia 2017).
leftist parties are still construed to have this agenda (El pueblo 2017).
Moreover, diplomats horrify Ceutans when, pressured by their Moroc-
can counterparts, they ambiguously state Ceuta’s future is a matter of
dialogue (El Faro 2012c, 2013). Mainland newscasters sometimes slip
into talking of Ceuta as if it lay outside of Spain, while pundits wonder
why Spain is slashing health and education budgets when the enclaves
could be sold to recoup losses (and now, before Morocco realises they
are worthless) (El Faro 2012d). 
Ceutans encountered fuzzy logic about Ceuta’s Spanishness prac-
tically daily. doubt is expressed regarding the waves of researchers,
nGO activists and journalists, who simplistically portray Ceuta as
either a fascist, bloody outpost of fortress Europe or an absurd and
unsustainable Spanish possession. They also grumble about those ‘de
fuera’ who repeatedly complain the enclave is boring, dirty and full of
closed-minded people. Many outsiders, indeed, see their stay in Ceuta
as a profitable (but hopefully) temporary step in their life, and grasp
every opportunity to escape to the mainland. They take with them,
obviously, the money earned in Ceuta. Friends and family willing to
pay the exorbitantly expensive ferry fare was always a cause for jubi-
lation, but their tendency to see Ceuta as merely a springboard to
Morocco was less amusing. Just as annoying was the typical placement
of Ceuta in Moroccan travel guides, companies that do not deliver to
Ceuta ‘because it’s not Spain’, and visitors who, when catching a
glimpse of the mainland across the sea, exclaim, ‘look, Spain!’ 
The Ceutan response is predictably clear. Whether via newspaper
articles or press conferences, in social media or informal conversation,
they remind transgressors that Ceuta is neither a ‘presidio’ (prison-fort)
nor just a bridge to Morocco. rather, they passionately argue, it is a
place, rich in history, beaches, bars, fusion restaurants, everything one
needs for a meaningful life! Morocco is exciting, true, but is also dan-
gerous and definitely sub-par to Ceuta, which already has all the
‘moruno’ stuff they seek! 
Visitors’ frustrating inability to see the danger posed by Morocco
renders them very  susceptible to harm. Therefore, Ceutans strongly
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discourage travellers. For example, dave, a British acquaintance who
wanted to go on a bicycle trip to rabat, had to endure weeks of dire
warnings from his Ceutan acquaintances: ‘the moros’ would steal his
bike, make him sleep in abysmal conditions, or refuse to help him
when in trouble. unlike dave, most travellers cannot be disheartened,
so my informants insisted they be accompanied by someone who
knows how to ‘walk’ there. 
neither a local nor a complete outsider, I found travelling with
mixed groups stressful and entertaining in equal parts. I absorbed
Ceutans’ relentless attempts to stop their companions from behaving
too much like regular tourists, aiming obnoxiously huge cameras at
veiled women preparing tagines or washing clothes by hand by the
springs, or trying to get (deliberately) lost in medinas, where – God
forbid – they might trespass into people’s homes looking for authentic
encounters. My Ceutan informants often also sought to control the
group’s official documents, and ensured they were the ones haggling
with shopkeepers, talking with the authorities or bailing out friends
who annoyed someone they tried to photograph. And in those pre-
cious few moments when exhausted Ceutan guides were not herding
or admonishing their troop, they might turn upon the anthropologist
and exasperatedly mutter that ‘they don’t know how to walk in
Morocco’. Their mainland guests, by contrast, when out of earshot of
their hosts, sometimes asked the anthropologist to explain this behav-
iour they found at best incredibly stifling (agobiante) and at worst out-
right paranoid or racist. 
Conclusions
What does the Ceutan case tell us about the resilience of stereotypes,
particularly in the face of personal experiences that contradict them?
The social sciences have already proposed a number of explanations.
Cognitive sociologists argue that stereotypes are the unavoidable result
of necessary neurological processes that simplify/categorise the world
around us, but this view ignores the moral-ideological aspects of stereo-
types (see Brubaker 2004). Other scholars suggest that stereotypes sur-
vive through cultural misunderstanding (dye and Keel 2011;
Hagendoorn 1993; loizos 2007). The iconic example is of the Irish-
man who picks a fight in an English pub, flies into rage and threatens
to assault his opponent. But bystanders – not being Irish – fail to deci-
pher the performance as an appeal for intervention. The desperate
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Irishman has no option but to actually fight, affirming the stereotype
of ‘hot-headed paddy’ (Macdonald 1993). Ceutans would be stunned
by this Irishman’s inability for critical thought, and claim that their
understanding of ‘the moro’ is based on reflection of how they think
they think. daniel rabinowitz has additionally implied that stereo-
types and personal experience are different phenomena with little
bearing on each other. Israelis, he observes, suspend their views of
palestinians when forming trust-based relations with them. These
experiences have no impact on palestinian stereotypes, particularly
when discussed with fellow Israeli Jews (rabinowitz 1992). Again, Ceu-
tans insist that their views of the ‘moro’ are informed by direct experi-
ence, and that the suspension of these views can only lead to tears.  
I offer two conclusions. The simplest observes that aside from being
useful in drawing boundaries between Moroccans, Ceutans and main-
land Spaniards, the stereotype of the ‘moro’ functions to flag Moroc-
cans as sources of specific kinds of danger, making interactions with
them a question of risk. At this stage, a pedestrian understanding of
risk-taking as an action with a chance of succeeding or failing will suf-
fice. Within this framework, the ‘moro’ as an indicator of danger is
reproduced regardless of the outcome of the trip. disaster, obviously,
confirms the danger they pose. But uneventful journeys merely mean
that travellers have either been lucky or have managed risk success-
fully. Moreover, minor incidents – women stared at, taxi drivers chang-
ing their fare midway through a journey – are taken to confirm the
existence of more terrible dangers lurking beneath the surface. There-
fore, stereotypes of Moroccans survive and are reproduced both as
markers of danger and as a set of expectations against which risk can
be assessed and navigated. Just as danger and risk affirm each other,
so do stereotypes and personal experiences of Moroccans.  
deeper analysis into the consistently negative view of Moroccans
(particularly when compared to the multiple ways Spaniards approach
the Moor) requires us to pursue the idea of ‘risk’. In contrast to econ-
omists and psychologists, who utilise highly controlled laboratory
experiments involving risk-taking as window on (individual) rational-
cognitive processes (e.g. Brunette et al. 2015; dohmen et al. 2011), soci-
ologists examine how risk is collectively constructed and politicised.
Here, the defining work is by niklas luhmann (1991) and ulrich Beck
(1986), who argue that recent technological advancements have cre-
ated new environmental (e.g. global warming) and social (e.g. nuclear
energy) dangers that cannot be individually or locally managed. Thus
the rise of ‘risk-Societies’, organised around the identification and
THE GOdS OF THE HunT
143
ajec260209_Layout 1  11/02/20  7:33 PM  Page 143
calculation of risk, itself a problem given postmodern doubts over sci-
entific objectivity. These anxieties have created new political move-
ments united not by class or ethnicity but by shared concerns about
the future. 
Anthropology contests the idea that the politicisation of risk is an
inherently Western, modern phenomenon (Cashdan 1990; douglas
and Wildavsky 1982). Anthropologists have rather shown that the way
danger is represented is closely bound to how societies structure them-
selves, culturally and politically (douglas 1966, 1992). They, therefore,
want to know why some dangers become objects of concern while oth-
ers remain hidden, overlooked or ignored (e.g. rosa 1998; Wildavsky
and dake 1990); how danger is represented, communicated and dealt
with (e.g. Ferreira 2001; Zinn 2008); who can authoritatively speak
about hazards, who is to blame when things go wrong, and how the
latter redistribute guilt (Alaszewski 2015). In other words, discourses
about risk point to, are backed up by and only make sense in relation
to a shared understanding of the world, its cultural boundaries and
the sociopolitical relations that proceed from them (Boholm 2003;
dale 1992; lupton 1999). 
Scholarly literature suggests that Spaniards revive the image of the
fraternal, honourable, peaceful Moor when they need Moroccan help
(e.g. during the Civil War) or docility (e.g. protectorate), when there is
money to be made (e.g. Granada) or where governments seek to con-
trol ethnic tensions (e.g. Barcelona). This suggests that the ‘moro’ is so
unambiguously negative in Ceuta because beyond the world of high-
government (which desperately needs Moroccan cooperation to ensure
the border keeps out undesirables while letting commerce through;
see Ferrer-Gallardo 2007) ‘moros’ are not directly needed for the finan-
cial wellbeing of Ceuta’s civil servants and military personnel. In
effect, while the protests of the successful populist movement ‘Ceuta
Insegura’, mostly composed of Ceutan civil servants, gives much atten-
tion to sub-Saharan migrants, whose spectacular assaults on the bor-
der fence Ceutans associate with a sense of urban insecurity, the chief
source of concern remains the ‘moro’. The movement therefore rou-
tinely begs the state to see the ‘moro’ for what he truly is: a deceitful
shapeshifter who is – unlike the sub-Saharan migrant whose presence
reinforces Ceuta’s utility to Spain – a threat to Ceuta’s very españolidad
(El Faro 2017b).
The literature on risk allows us to elaborate this position, and pro-
pose that the ‘moro’ perseveres because this hostile figure lies at the
core of a specific world view, complete with its cultural categories and
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implied power relations that enables Ceutans to respond to the threats
they detect coming from all sides. The malevolent ‘moro’ is neither the
outcome of blind prejudice (lippmann’s view) nor simply the product
of neocolonial relationships between Ceutans and Moroccans (the
Saidian view). Instead, the historically received figure of the moro is
edited and cultivated by multiple interested actors operating in an
uncertain political context that hems and isolates Ceutans in general
and local Muslims in particular. 
For example, we saw Moroccan taxi drivers and domestic servants
entertaining Ceutans’ notions of the ‘moro’, fuelling the idea that dis-
aster must be mitigated by carefully relying on trustworthy contacts.
This should not surprise us, for they use this risk framework to get
Spaniards to hire their services while disheartening them from indis-
criminately switching to their competitors. Self-stereotyping becomes
a tool for maintaining Spanish patronage and differentiating Moroc-
can labour. 
Ceutan Muslims’ claim to españolidad also makes use of Moroccans
as malignant antagonists. Their tragic narratives, as well as their eager
participation in the anti-Moroccan (possibly anti-Muslim) ‘Ceuta Inse-
gura’, explicitly seeks to impress upon fellow Ceutan compatriots that
they are part of the same community of risk and anxiety, and that the
sociocultural boundary between Muslim Ceutans and Moroccans, so
constantly challenged and doubted both by both Moroccans and
Spaniards, is actually a real one sustained by the threat of extreme vio-
lence. Worries about the suppression of their Spanishness are also
expressed by the way these narratives distribute blame. They explicitly
suggest that Ceuta’s Muslims are especially vulnerable because –
despite the rhetoric of convivencia that insists that all of Ceuta’s ethno-
religious groups are equally Spanish – the city’s authorities seem to
make very little effort to bail Muslims out of trouble, leaving them
trapped between two powerful groups that brew in tandem a deadly
concoction of structural and physical violence.   
Yet, the dangerous Moroccan is primarily used by Christian Ceutans
who constantly fear that their city’s españolidad is in danger. As
described, Ceutans generally feel slighted by friends who act as if
Ceuta’s main merit is its proximity to Morocco, by ‘de fuera’ who see
Ceuta as basically Moroccan or as just a big money bag, by newscasters
who mistake Ceuta’s identity, and by outsiders dismissing the enclave
as a presidio full of soldiers and trapped migrants. To my informants,
these little statements reflected a widespread ambiguity about Ceuta
that could  have significant political and economic effects in the future. 
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Occasionally, yet very rarely, my informants embraced this semi-
exoticness. Two aged interlocutors, for example, enjoyed telling stories
about their childhood in larache to their sons-in-law. Similarly, the
Ceuta’s charismatic president routinely complains that Ceuta is for-
gotten and marginalised by Madrid, or boasts that it is an unprece-
dented multicultural experiment. This rhetoric has been successful in
siphoning considerable funding for public services or other projects
that sustain Ceuta’s many cultural and religious associations. never-
theless, my informants’ ubiquitous tactic was to resist, not play along
with, a moral geography that condemns Ceuta to being in cultural
limbo. This, of course, was done by trying to impose their risk frame-
work on outsiders. Morocco becomes barbaric, not exotic; treacherous,
not hospitable. This framework also reconfigures Ceuta as a safe
haven, a place in the anthropological sense: a space where one can cre-
ate meaningful lives, relationships and identities, valuable in itself
rather than simply for the places it leads to and from. 
This risk-imaginary additionally rearranges the relationship
between Ceutans and outsiders. Ceutans stop being the closed-minded
inhabitants of a border-fort but emerge as risk experts. Enjoyment of
Morocco’s pleasures will therefore depend on the vast anecdotal
knowledge of these marcher-lords. In adopting Ceutan leadership, the
visitor is discursively infantilised as the holder of orientalist fantasies.
unable to see or navigate danger, visitors’ self-presentation and com-
munication with the world must be strictly supervised. Moroccan
stereotypes are, in other words, essential in inverting the hierarchy
between Ceutan and Spaniard. It enables Ceutans to construct a world
where knowledge is power.   
But all of this, of course, first requires outsiders to accept the Ceutan
risk-imaginary and the stereotypes that lie at its heart. Ceutan Muslims
and Moroccans might accept this risk framework because the world it
engenders furthers their political and economic interests. My inform-
ants, however, had no sure way of imposing this ontology on outsiders.
All they had going for them was relentless dedication to their city,
insistence that their views were based on the rational deduction of per-
sonal experience, and the muted respect guests show hosts. As the
opening vignette shows, at least one foreigner succumbed to the risk-
imaginary. Other outsiders were hardier. So, in hindsight, perhaps it
is a silent tribute to the drunk Irishman in an English pub that when
Ceutans perform their spectacle of anxiety, responsibility, knowledge
and risk, the visitor-guest reads the role he is meant to play out, and
wonder whether in their zealous attempts to emphasise their españoli-
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dad, they actually come around as a bit paranoid, likely a bit racist,
definitely a bit presidio. 
BRIAN CAMPBELL, Max planck Institute for Social
Anthropology. E-mail: campbell@eth.mpg.de
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